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MINNESOTA LAV REVIEW

THE DELIVERY OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY:
FUNCTION AND SCOPE OF THE DELIVERY CONCEPT FOR CONFLICT OF LAWS PURPOSES*
By

WENDELL CARNAHANt

T

HE word "delivery" constitutes one of the most important
terms in the cases dealing with the conflict of laws of life
insurance. This term does not have a single meaning but is
applied in a number of different ways and with different connotations when employed in relation to various factual situations. It
is the purpose of this article to examine the cases and the considerations which bear upon the function and scope of the delivery
concept as it is employed in connection with life insurance
policies in the conflict of laws.
As a basis for certain essential distinctions, it is necessary
to make explicit certain established principles, even though they
are generally familiar ones. In dealing with problems of contracts in the conflict of laws various courts have evolved three
main and distinct rules-the rules of the place of making, of the
place of performance, and of the intention of the parties. The
majority of courts, for most purposes, follow the rule of the place
of making in determining the validity of contracts in conflict of
laws cases. But the decisions from any single jurisdiction do not
consistently adhere to any one of these three rules. While various
considerations underlie a judicial choice and employment of these
three rules, they are not entirely distinct, in that the factor of the
place of making may also be important in the application of the
latter two rules. That is, a court which employs the place of performance rule may find that the matter of performance in question
was to occur in the state which was also the place where the contract was made and is therefore to be governed by its law; in this
situation the rule of the place of performance is applied, but is
expressed in the opinion as being the same as the rule of the place
where the making of the contract occurred. Courts which apply
the test of the intention of the parties in life insurance cases limit
the scope of their choice to states of the place of making or of
performance of the contract; consequently when a court applying
*This paper forms the basis for a chapter in a forthcoming book on

Conflict of Laws in Life Insurance Contracts. All rights reserved.
"Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.

DELIVERY OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY

this rule finds an intention of the parties that the problems presented by the contract shall be governed by the law of the place
of making, it is necessary that the opinion designate where the
contract came into existence. Hence the importance of the phrase
"place of making" is not confined to the first rule, but extends to
all three basic choice-of-laws principles governing contracts. It
is therefore essential that the term "place of making" be clearly
defined.
A recent treatise on Conflict of Laws gives the following
definitions:
"The phrase 'place of contracting' and its equivalents, the
place of making or the place where the contract was made, properly mean the place in which the final act was done which made the
promise or promises binding."'
And, in regard to insurance, "in general, of course, the place of
contracting is where the policy is delivered."- The place of contracting, then, is that place in which was performed the last necessary act in order to constitute a binding agreement and that place
will usually be the place of acceptance of the offer; in insurance
cases acceptance of the offer will be manifested by "delivery"
of the policy.
Unless the term "delivery" has a rigid and inflexible meaning
it is apparent that, even among courts which follow the place of
making test, the choice-of-laws rule may shift from one state to
another accordingly as a court so defines this term as to connect
the contract with one of the important states. In other words,
if "delivery" is synonymous with "acceptance," and if courts
find that for various purposes acceptance may be manifested by
different sets of facts, then the rules ultimately chosen to govern
specific conflict of laws problems in life insurance will be dependent upon the courts' determination of what constitutes acceptance.
A court may hold that acceptance of the offer to become insured
occurred at the time and place where the policy itself came into
the physical, manual control of the applicant; then that state is
the place of delivery. But a court may find that acceptance of the
offer to become insured occurred at the time and place when the
insurer approved the application and prepared the policy for
transmission to the applicant; then the state of the insurer's
home-office is the place of delivery. The rules of those two states
'2 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) sec. 311.1, p.
1045. This rule is also stated in the American Law Institute's Restatement
of the Law of Contracts (1932) sec. 74.
-2 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) sec. 317.1, p. 1054.
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in relation to the precise question before a forum court may be
entirely different.
For most purposes the overwhelming majority of conflict of
laws cases which follow the place of making rule hold that the
last act necessary to make a binding contract of life insurance
occurred at the place of physical receipt of the policy by the
applicant; but in reaching this conclusion various factors are
considered and expressed in opinions which give different connotations to the term "delivery," even though these connotations
all point to selection of rules of law of the same state. In certain types of cases-including those dealing with binder receipts
issued at the time of application, instances of death before manual
receipt of the document, and some phases of non-forfeiture )roblems-a court may hold that making and delivery of the contract
occurred at the place of the insurer's home-office. While cases
of the latter type are in the distinct minority, both in number of
cases and in the types of situations in which the rule of the place
of making will be applied in an unusual way, these cases present
important problems and in them it is essential that shifting content
of the terms "place of making," "last necessary act," and "delivery" be sharply noticed. Although courts may be in almost
universal agreement upon one content of these phrases as applied
to specific problems, it does not follow that the same content of
the terms will apply to all other problems.
Furthermore it is to be pointed out that these terms do not
necessarily have the same meaning in cases presenting conflict
of laws problems of insurance which they have in cases dealing
only with the "general or internal law" of insurance. By the latter
terms is meant a non-conflict of laws situation-one in which
interstate factors which might give rise to application of choiceof-laws rules are either non-existent or are ignored by the courts
in their opinions dealing with concrete facts. By a conflict of
laws case is meant one wherein the opinion recognizes and discusses the interstate relationships, by reason of which judicial
application of conflict of laws rules selects for enforcement the
general or internal law rule of the state having dominant contacts
with the operative facts of the case.
Before considering conflict of laws decisions notice will first
be taken of the function of the delivery concept as used in the
general law of insurance for comparison with its function in conflict of laws cases. In the light of these purposes the conflict of
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laws cases developing various Contents of the term "delivery"
may be more readily grouped. The connotations of the phrase,
as indicated in this article, run throughout the whole conflict of
laws portion of the insurance field in subdivisions such as warranties, beneficiaries, incontestability, etc.
Several analyses which no doubt are familiar to lawyers have
been made of cases dealing vith the delivery of a life insurance
policy.3 But those materials deal almost exclusively with problems
of delivery in relation to the various internal law rules adopted by
courts and the types of problems there considered are different
from those raised by conflict of laws cases. Consequently the
approach taken and the conclusions reached in analyses of general
insurance lav are of only limited utility in reference to conflict
of laws problems and important distinctions must be noticed.
In the internal law of insurance, that is, where conflict of laws
problems are not considered, the cases which discuss the element
of delivery are concerned with ascertaining the time when insurance became effective, and are not concerned, as are the conflict
of laws cases, with the place where the contract had its inception.
In the general law of insurance the question is this: Was there
effective insurance coverage? The time at which insurance became effective then becomes important in deciding such mediate
questions as these: Was the applicant under a duty to disclose
changes in health after the application was signed; or, was a subsequent premium paid promptly? In those cases the time of inception of the contract is expressed in terminology of delivery, and
subsidiary questions which are dependent upon that preliminary
determination are decided by the general principles of insurance
law obtaining in the state where suit is brought.
In the conflict of laws cases, on the other hand, there is seldom
any issue as to whether the insurance relationship had come into
existence; determination of the time when the contract had its
inception is useful only for the purpose of determining the place
of making of the contract in order that the court may thereby
ascertain a rule of law to be used for resolving problems presented
by a particular policy. Furthermore, the time of inception may be
different for internal and for conflict of laws purposes.
It cannot be too much emphasized that, in both internal law
31 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance (2d ed. 1927) 627-682; 1 Couch, Cyc.

of Ins. Law (1929) 221-258; 1 Appleman, Insurance (1941) sec. 131-143;
Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930) sec. 70; Patterson, The Delivery of a
Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198.
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cases and in conflict of laws cases dealing with life insurancc
policies, the delivery concept is only a means and never an end.
The point in issue in a concrete case is not whether or where the
policy was delivered. The question in a particular case is whether
health statements are warranted, whether suicide constitutes an
excepted risk, what constitutes insurable interest, whether an
applicant must make disclosure of changes in health after the application was signed, etc. In the internal law cases, if a preliminary
determination of time of inception of the contract bears upon a
solution of these ultimate questions, a court will ascertain when
the policy was in force and will use the concept of delivery for
that purpose. In conflict of laws cases, when a preliminary determination of the place where the contract had its inception is necessary in order to select a choice-of-laws rule to govern these ultimate questions, a court will ascertain where the contract was made
by determining where it was delivered; that is, the delivery concept is employed to find the place of making of the contract and
then inquiry is made into the appropriate rule of that state. In
strict theory the consequence of the selection is not considered
before the choice is made; actually one often suspects from the
cases that selection was made with the consequence in view. 4 The
delivery concept is only a tool and how that tool will be employed
in relation to problems of life insurance cannot accurately be
determined merely by an inspection of the four corners of the
insurance policy.
Although the functions of the delivery concept in internal and
conflict of laws situations are different there are some points of
similarity which may be noticed in the operation of the rule in the
two types of cases. The social need for certainty in rules of law
and the formalism anciently attendant upon the delivery of instruments in writing carried over in a formative period to insurance
policies and then resulted in a tendency for the internal law to
define delivery in terms of manual tradition of the document. In
conflict of laws cases the perpetuation of this interpretation has
been influenced by two factors.
The first factor is that of social policy in relation to life insurance. The great majority of conflict of laws cases will arise in
the state where the applicant lived and "took out" his policy of
4Cavers,
A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, (1933) 47 Harvard
L. Rev. 173, 180-181, 185, 192-193, recognizes the process and urges that
it be an articulate feature in opinions.
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insurance, where the beneficiaries dependent upon the proceeds
reside and where there is the strongest social policy in their favor.
Numerous cases reiterate the vital concern of each state over
insurance contracts made with its citizens or within its borders.
In every case the governing rule is selected from two or more
divergent expressions of general law, each of which prevails in a
state having one or more contacts with the insurance relationship.
Determination that certain facts constitute delivery designates,
emphasizes and localizes one of the most important steps in the
progression from circumstances to legal consequences by which
rights and duties are created and measured, and the cases all
declare that delivery is one of the few possible dominant contacts
indicating the appropriate law to govern relationships represented
by a policy of life insurance.
The consequence is expected that in many instances the term
delivery will be defined in such ways as to draw control over the
contract away from the law of the insurer's home-state to a law
favorable to the insured; that expectation has been fulfilled. Employment of delivery in a literal sense, for the purpose of fixing
the governing law, will serve to refer most questions of insurance
to the general internal rules of the state where the applicant resided and where the contract is thus said to be made. Similarly,
in cases where the forum was not the place of making, if the place
of trial adopts the place of making rule for choice-of-laws purposes,
the effect again is to refer to the law usually most favorable to the
insured. And if a case presents a question on which the homestate of the insured is not sympathetic to his claim, the place of
trial is not likely to be more so. A formalistic and literal interpretation of delivery tends to effectuate the social policy of a state
by enabling it to apply its own rules which are favorable to its
residents claiming under an insurance policy.
The second factor tending to perpetuate a formalistic conception of delivery in these cases is found in conflict of laws rules
themselves. It was pointed out that not only do the majority of
courts adopt in insurance cases the rule of the place of making,
which emphasizes delivery, but also that determination of the place
where the contract was made may be an important step in the
application by other courts of the rules of the place of performance
and the intention of the parties. Definition of delivery in a literal
sense for conflict of laws purposes tends toward certainty in the
selection of a state whose law will be applied to specific questions
raised by life insurance policies.
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It was pointed out above that tile function of the delivery
concept is different in problems of internal law and of conflict
of laws, and it is also true that the operation of the concept is
different in the two fields. The cases show that for conflict of
laws purposes most courts, for most purposes, adopt the most
literal connotation of the term-that of manual receipt of the
policy by the applicant; in internal law cases, for purposes there
important, the term is related to circumstances antecedent to and
occurring at a different place than manual tradition of the paper.
The delivery concept, while of major importance, is not the
only factor which must be considered in determining the rules
of law by which courts solve conflict of laws problems raised by
life insurance policies. Life insurance law has been characterized
by the great number of cases decided against the carriers; in the
conflict of laws there are several important tools in the judicial
workbench which assist in accomplishing that end. If the policy
expressly provides, as many of the earlier ones (lid, that the
contract shall be construed and governed by the law of the homestate of the carrier, and hence not by the law of the place of
making, will this specification be effective ?' Quite generally not,
if the law of the place of making is more favorable to the insured
upon the precise point in issue. But if the law of the state
specified is more favorable to the insured, the express provision
may be controlling.6 The policy may expressly provide for or be
construed to contemplate payment of premiums at the homeoffice of the insurer and payment of death benefits there, i.e., that
state may be taken as the place of performance. A court finding
a liberal rule prevailing at that place may adopt the rule that questions relating to the contract are governed by the law of the place
of performance and may employ the law of the state so indicated.
Then also it is possible to divide up the right-duty relationship into
small bundles and hold that some of these bundles are governed
by rules distinct from the original contract and may have their own
places of making; some writers consider that this has been (lone
5
This question has been an important one in connection with problems of warranties and representations and has also arisen in connection
with certain aspects of non-forfeiture legislation. See Carnahan, Conflict of
Laws Treatment of Warranties and Representations in Life Insurance

Policies, (1941) 27 Wash. U. L. Q. 30.
6

E.g., Missouri State L. Ins. Co. v. Lovelace, (1907)

1 Ga. App. 446,

58 S. E. 93; Massachusetts Ben. L. Assoc. v. Robinson, (1898) 104 Ga.
256, 30 S. E. 918, 42 L. R. A. 261; cf. Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc. v.
Harris, (1900) 94 Tex. 25, 57 S. W. 635, 86 Am. St. Rep. 813.
7See 2 Beale. Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) secs. 348.1, 348.2.
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in connection -with assignments- and with loan agreements., Another device, which may lead to a governing rule different from
that of the place of making, turns around procedural limitations of
the forum ;9 while of limited scope it is nevertheless an important
factor.
Even as applied to cases dealing only with internal law rules,
the word "delivery" is not self-defining and the idea of manual
transfer of the policy is only one of its connotations ;o it has been
pointed out above that this is also true in the use of the term in
conflict of laws cases. In the following pages are considered the
various ways in -which courts have employed different connotations
of the delivery factor and given meaning and content to the general
concept, adapting the term and fitting it into the scope of the place
of making rule until the two phrases are almost synonymous,
both conveniently indefinite, and both working toward accomplishment of the public policy in favor of the insured.
1.

TiE LAST NEcEssARY

AcT

It is very common to find opinions, relying upon the broadest
general propositions, which declare that the state where the last
act necessary to create a contract occurred is the place of delivery;
these cases do not necessarily hold that delivery is the last necessary act. Sometimes the general statement is amplified by indication of the precise act which was the last necessary link in the
formation of the contractual relationship. The following language
from a California case' is typical, although the courts are frequently not as explicit:
"In this case, as intended by the parties, the plaintiff received
the policy in California upon the payment of the first year's presSee 2 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) sec. 3172; Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (Amer. L. Inst. 1934) sec. 318,
Comment B3; 1 Couch, Cyc. of Ins. Law (1929) sec. 208; 2 Cooley, Briefs
on the
Law of Insurance (2d ed. 1927) sec. 1033-1034.
9

This was employed, e.g., by the state courts in John Hancock Mut.
L. Ins. Co. v. Yates, (1936) 182 Ga. 213, 185 S. E. 268; but the Supreme

Court of the United States held that this particular application went too
far and violated the full faith and credit clause (1936) 299 U. S. 178, 57
Sup. Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106. The case was widely discussed in law
journals: (1937) 6 Brooklyn L. Rev. 463; (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 485;
(1937) 9_2
Corn. L. Q. 384; (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 520: (1937) 21
MiNNTEsOT-A LAW REaviw 842; (1937) 3 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 216; (1937) 43
IV. Va. L. Q. 229.
' 0 See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919)

33 Harv. L. Rev. 198 passim.
"Flittner v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S., (1916) 30 Cal. App.

209, 157 Pac. 630, 632, 633 (disaffirmance by infant).
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mium in advance. The last act, therefore, essential to the consummation of the contract of insurance was done in California;
and it follows under the authorities that the contract was made
in California. .

.

. While the law of the place of performance of

the insurance contract governs as to its construction and legal
effect, nevertheless, as a general proposition, the law of the place
where the contract was made controls as to its execution and valid"
ity, including the capacity of the parties to make the contract. ....
Definition of the place of making of the contract of insurance in terms of the general phrase "last necessary act" has been
employed to designate the law governing a wide variety of problems. 12 As the cases have used this general phrase they have
tended to develop a connotation of delivery which is that of the
formalistic manual transfer of the policy.
The narrow definition of the place of "the last necessary act"
given in the cases cited occasions difficulty when a court is confronted with unusual circumstances. If the applicant dies while
the policy is in the mails it may be highly expedient to hold that
the insurance contract was concluded antecedent to receipt of the
evidentiary symbol. On these facts a court may reject the idea
of manual receipt as constituting delivery and may find that the
"last necessary act" occurred at an earlier time and at the place
of the insurer's home-office;' " or a court may decide the case
12

Ruhlin v. New York L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d)
931, cert. denied (1940) 309 U. S. 655, 60 Sup. Ct. 469, 84 L. Ed. 1005,
rehearing denied (1940) 309 U. S. 695, 60 Sup. Ct. 588, 84 L. Ed. 1035
(incontestability regarding disability-dictum) ; McElroy v. Metropolitan
L. Ins. Co., (1909) 84 Neb. 866, 122 N. W. 27, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.)
968, 19 Ann. Cas. 28 (premium notices) ; Grant v. North America [len.
Corp., (1928) 223 Mo. App. 104, 8 S. W. (2d) 1043 (consequence of
unlicensed business); Hare & Chase, Inc. v. National Surety Co., (S.).
N.Y. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 447 (commercial guarantee; general insurance
statute applied to non-disclosure) ; Limbaugh v. Monarch L. Ins. Co., (Mo.
App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 208 (accident policy; misrepresentations)
Lincoln Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1930) 41 F. (2d)
12 (fraudulent statements for reinstatement) ; Lukens v. International IL.
Ins. Co., (1917) 269 Mo. 574, 191 S. W. 418, writ of error dismissed
(1919) 248 U. S. 596, 39 Sup. Ct. 182, 63 L. Ed. 438 (suicide) ; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, (D. Or. 1880) 7 Sawy. 17, 5 Fed.
225 (validity of contract of unlicensed corporation) ; Fields v. Equitable
L. Assur. Soc. of U. S., (Mo. App. 1938) 118 S. W. (2d) 521 (suicide) ;
Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of World v. Havas, (1927) 217 Ky. 846. 290
S. W. 690 (insanity) ; Weiditschka v. Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees, (1919) 188 Iowa 183, 170 N. W. 300, rehearing denied (1920)
188 Iowa 183, 175 N. W. 835 (permissible classes of beneficiaries) ; Bukowski v. Security Ben. Assoc. of Topeka, Kan., (1935) 221 Iowa 416, 261
N. W. 783 (misrepresentations).
l 3 See Coci v. New York L. Ins. Co., (1924) 155 La. 1060, 99 So.
871; Jackson v. New York L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d)
31; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Babcock, (1898) 104 Ga. 67, 30 S. E.
273, 42 L. R. A. 88; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, (C.C.A. 9th
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upon principles of general insurance law, which are favorable to
the insured in this situation, 14 without consideration of conflict of
laws features of the case.
2. PAYMENT OF PRnmIuMs-IN GENERAL
An examination of the forms currently employed by one
hundred thirteen American companies shows that almost universally the application or the policy provides that the insurance shall
not be effective until payment of the first premium by the applicant.15 Very frequently this condition is coupled with the requirement of delivery.'" These provisions have had important effects
in the conflict of laws cases.
While information is not available showing the origin and
evolution of these clauses, the provision for payment of the premium was designed entirely to prevent attachment of the risk and
not as a device for controlling the place of making of the contract.
This stipulation has quite consistently been construed by the courts
as a condition precedent, but the cases have failed to differentiate
between conditions precedent-to-formation of the contract and
conditions precedent-to-performance by the carrier.'
Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 707, cert. den. (1923)
521, 67 L. Ed. 1211.

262 U. S. 745, 43 Sup. Ct.

Contra: Ofield v. National Ben. L. Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
293 S. W. 271; Hardie v. St. Louis Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1874) 26 La.

Ann. 242; cf. Rogers v. Charter Oak L. Ins. Co., (1874) 41 Conn. 97.
14See cases in Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy,
(1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 202-218; Note, Operation of Binding Receipts in Life Insurance, (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 1223, 1225-1228.
5

' For this purpose comparison was made of the forms of the one
hundred thirteen American companies given in the Handy Guide (Spectator Co. 1938). In nineteen instances this publication does not give
the form of the application used. In sixteen of those instances the companies supplied the writer with specimen application blanks. Of these
one hundred ten forms, eighty-three provide in the application that the
policy is not in force until payment of the first premium; six include this
provision in the policy only; sixteen include it in both policy and application; and five make no provision on this point.
160f the one hundred ten forms examined, ninety-six provide in
the application or policy or both that the policy must be delivered; there
is variance in the form of this provision, including the following clauses:
"delivered by a duly authorized agent of the company;". "manually (or
actually) delivered to the applicant;" and "delivered during applicant's
life and
continuance in good health."
7
1 The distinction is made in Costigan, Performance of Contracts
(1911) 5. It has been utilized in analyzing problems of representations
and wrarranties by Patterson, Warranties in Insurance Law, (1934) 34
Col. L. Rev. 595, 605, 608; and in reference to the delivery-in-good-health
clause in Note, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1508, 1515. In regard to general
elauses requiring delivery, Patterson states that "most courts have held
these stipulations fix a condition precedent to the commencement of the
risk." Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 198, 220.
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This distinction might well be taken by the courts, and would
have a material bearing upon the approach to some insurance
problems. Several factors must occur before a contract comes
into existence; they include at least the offer and acceptance which
give rise to legal rights and obligations expressed in the agreement. In respect to contracts requiring the payment of money,
it is generally sufficient that one party is legally bound to make
payment, and it is not required that he should have paid the money
before the contract comes into existence; that is, payment is not
a condition precedent-to-formation of the contract. As applied
to insurance, the obligation of the applicant to make payment
arises at the time the contract was formed, i.e., when the insurer
approved the risk and manifested an intention to be bound. There
are two circumstances in insurance cases which militate against the
view that payment of the premium must be made before the contract is formed. The first is the fact that the insurance company
does actually accept the offer contained in the application and does
issue the policy before payment has been made; this may be taken
as an indication that no condition actually existed or, if so, that
the condition has been waived. The second is a matter of construction of the payment-of-the-premium clause. The payment
clause in the application is usually not sufficiently clearly phrased
as to justify an interpretation which is unusual in contracts cases;
if the clause in the policy is the important factor, it is introduced
after the offer has been made and accepted by the insurer. Although it is proper to consider the clause as a condition, it is not
one which must be complied with before the offeree (insurer)
shall be taken as having entered into a contractual relationship.
It is therefore precedent only to performance. The importance
of the distinction lies in the fact that it is of greatest concern to
the applicant that the contract shall have its inception at the
earliest possible time. This conforms with the public policy of
a state to secure the greatest protection for its residents. This
public policy may be reflected in two other rules. The first is the
rule that in some circumstances, constituting impossibility of performance, recovery may be permitted although strict performance
has not occurred: one of those situations might arise when the
applicant died after the risk had been approved and before he had
had opportunity to make performance of payment at the time the
policy would be tendered by an agent of the insurer. The second
is the tendency of most courts in conflict of laws cases to hold that
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the insurance contract is made in the state where the application is
taken.
The contractual elements in an insurance agreement consist
of an offer on the part of the applicant to become insured and
bound to pay the premium, an acceptance by the insurer issuing
the policy in reliance upon the covenant or promise of payment
but also subject to a condition of payment and, finally, performance of the condition by the insured. The company is subject to
expenses for approval of the application and for the medical
examination in the event the applicant changes his mind before
receipt of the policy. But the difficulty of enforcing these small
claims leads an insurer to avoid the contract for failure of the
condition rather than to insist upon performance of the covenant
of payment. Retention of the policy for delivery, from the legal
point of view, is for the purpose of preventing a waiver of the
condition (payment).
The insurer is, of course, vitally interested in two points; it
wishes to secure payment of the premium and to have opportunity
to refuse the offer if the applicant is not an acceptable risk. In instances where the premium is paid in advance it is possible to
hold that approval of the application at the home-office of the
insurer completes the contract.18 Adoption of this principle as an
internal rule of insurance will protect the applicant in case of
death or adverse changes in health in the period between approval
and actual manual transfer of the policy to him by the soliciting
agent. 9 The converse situation presented when application has
been made without advance payment of the premium might also
be construed as an offer, subject to a condition precedent-to-formation that the home-office indicate its acceptance of the offer by
approval of the application; as indicated above, there is yet the
condition precedent-to-performance that the first premium shall
be paid. Here, also, the insured could be protected against contingencies of death or interim changes in health after approval of
the application. But this possibility is based upon weaker facts
and it also has generally been rejected.
18lf the policies and applications examined, thirteen provide that the
application must be approved and accepted by the home-office; it is probably an open question whether, upon approval and acceptance, the policy

would be deemed "delivered" without further facts. Modification of the
figure given must be recognized in some instances where payment of the

first premium is made in advance and a certain type of binder receipt is
issued. Binder receipts are considered in the following subdivision.
' 9 Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198, 221.
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Whatever may have been the purpose of the paynient-of-thepremium clause and whatever may be the judicial approach to
purely internal law problems, it is clear that the conflict of laws
cases have utilized this clause for localization of the contract.
Usually this relation connects the contract with the state which
was the domicil of the insured and in most instances his domicil
will be in the state of the forum. The conflict of laws cases, in
which making of the contract has been connected with the factor
of payment of premiums, have been of the second type suggested
above, that is, instances where payment was apparently to occur
after the time when the policy had been received by the soliciting
agent. For conflict of laws purposes the courts have here focused
attention upon payment as the significant act20 rather than considering approval of the application as constituting acceptance by
the insurance company. This approach emphasizes payment as a
significant contact with the forum or domicil of the applicant and
the law of that place will then be applied.
Although many of the older cases pay homage to the formation
of a contract as a result of meeting of the minds of the parties, the
prevailing rule in contract law requires an element of coniniunication.2 1 Most frequently the act amounting to acceptance will
actually be communicated to the offeror2 2 but, as will be indicated
in a later subdivision dealing with mailing of the policy, in some
types of contract cases it has been settled that constructive accep20
1n the following cases the courts have emphasized provisions for
payments of premiums for localization of the contract: Equitable L. Assur.
Soc. of U. S. v. Clements (Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Pettus),
(1891) 140 U. S. 226, 11 Sup. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497 (forfeiture) ; Mutual
L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Cohen, (1900) 179 U. S. 262, 21 Sup. Ct. 106.
45 L. Ed. 181 (premium notices) ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Dingley.
(C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1900) 40 C. C. A. 459, 100 Fed. 408. 49 L. R. A.
132, reversed (1902) 184 U. S. 695, 22 Sup. Ct. 937, 46 L. Ed. 763 on
authority of Cohen case supra (premium notices); Waddell v. New
England Mut. L. Ins. Co., (1924) 83 Ind. App. 209, 147 N. E. 816 (forfeiture) ; Hardie v. St. Louis Mut. L. Ins. Co., (1874) 26 La. Ann. 242
(interim death) ; Grevenig v. Washington L. Ins. Co. of N. Y., (1903)
112 La. 879, 36 So. 790, 104 Am. St. Rep. 474 (premium notices) : Iolan
v. Mutual Res. Fund L. Assoc., (1899) 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E. 398 (misrepresentations) ; Coscarello v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., (1913) 175 Mo.
App. 130, 157 S. W. 873 (misrepresentations); Schuler v. Metropolitan L.
Ins. Co.. (1915) 191 MIo. App. 52, 176 S. W. 274 (misrepresentations).
211 Williston, Contracts (1936) sees. 64-71.
-2The only conflict of laws case found in which there was intimation

that communication of acceptance was not necessary is Lincoln Nat. ..
Ins. Co. v. Hammer, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 12; the case
involved application for reinstatement and it is possible that the types of
problems are distinct. The court did, however, rely heavily upon the "meet-

ing of the minds" explanation of acceptance. Cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Milonas (1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 343, 179 At. 107.
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tance may occur at the time when a letter is posted." There are
insurance cases following the rule that communication may be constructive, but most of them deal with questions of internal law, and
in them the court was considering only the time and not the place
factor. The latter becomes of primary importance only in conflict
of laws cases,2 4 and decisions involving general insurance law are
not authoritative in solution of the other type of problem. It is
entirely possible that in conflict of laws cases the courts have
generally been disinclined to adopt a theory of constructive delivery because of its tendency to relate applicable law to the state
of the insurer's home-office instead of to the state residence of
the applicant.
The prevalent practice of delaying acceptable arrangements for
payment of the first premium until receipt of the written document, and the existence of strong reasons for connecting the
contract with a state whose laws are favorable to the insured have
combined to make payment one of the most significant acts. In
conflict of laws the great majority of courts, for most purposes,
have not considered the possibility of acceptance occurring upon
some significant act at the company's home-office but have stressed
payment of the premium as the last necessary act. This has been
true even in instances where it appeared that payment had been
made in advance and it would have been possible for the court to
find, with this condition and covenant already performed, that the
insurance had its inception at the time the insurer approved the
application.2 5 "Payment of the premium" has been made one
of the major connotations of the delivery concept in conflict of
laws cases.2 6
23
The leading case establishing this rule is Adams v. Lindsell, (1818)
1 B. 24& Aid. 681; see 1 Williston, Contracts (2d ed. 1936) sec. 81.
The conflict of laws cases are indicated in a later division dealing
with 25mailing of the policy.
jackson v. New York L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1925) 7 F.
(2d) 31 (death before actual delivery) ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Otto, (1927)

153 Md. 179, 138 At. 16 (death before actual delivery-not a conflicts

case); Keenan v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., (1929) 50 R. I. 158,
146 Atl. 401 (misrepresentations) ; Fidelity Mlut. L. Assoc. v. Harris, (1900)
94 Tex. 25, 57 S. W. 635, 86 Am. St. Rep. 813 (misrepresentations).
Contra, Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Perkins, (1907) 41 Ind.
App. 183, 80 N. W. 682. A resident of Kentucky paid the first premium at
the time of application to the agent of a New York corporation and the
policy was received by mail, but whether from the home-office or the
Kentucky agency does not appear. Under Kentucky law a forfeiture would
later have occurred, so plaintiff tried to secure protection of a New York
statute requiring notice by mail of premiums due. The court held for
plaintiff upon the ground that acceptance occurred in New York by mailing for unconditional delivery.

-6Northwestern [Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McCue, (1912) 223 U. S. 234, 32

.IlI.\.\'FSOT.I". L,
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Another phase of the conflict of laws rule based upon payment of premiums is presented by the use of the so-called binder
receipts. Some time must necessarily elapse between the application and receipt of a policy. When the premium is not paid in
advance it is possible for an applicant to change his mind during
this period; the insurance company bears the incidental expenses.
It is also possible that an applicant may die or suffer impairment
of health. For different reasons each party is therefore interested
in security against adverse circumstances in the interim. As has
Sup. Ct. 220, 56 L. Ed. 419, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 57 (legal execution);
Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, (D. Or. 1880) 7 Sawy. 17, 5
Fed. 225 (validity of contract by unlicensed corporation)
Berry v.
Knights Templars' & Masons' Life Indem. Co., (W.D. Mo. 1891) 46 Fed.
439, affirmed (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1892) 50 Fed. 511 (suicide) ; Wall v.
Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S., (W.D. Mo. 1887) 32 Fed. 273, affirmed
sub. nom. Equitable L. Ins. Co. v. Clements, (1891) 140 U. S. 226, 11
Sup. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497 (forfeiture for non-payment of premiutms);
Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Robinson. (N.D. Iowa 1893) 54 Fed. 580.
affirmed (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 58 Fed. 723, 19 U. S. App. 266, 22
L. R. A. 325 (misrepresentations); Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v.
Winning, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 58 Fed. 541, 19 U. S. App. 173 (forfeiture for non-payment of premiums) ; Hicks v. National L. Ins. Co.,
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1894) 60 Fed. 690, 20 U. S. App. 410 (forfeiture for
non-payment of premiums) ; Provident Say. L. Assur. Soc. v. Hadley,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1900) 102 Fed. 856 (misrepresentations) ; Jackson v.
New York L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 31 (death before
actual delivery) ; Pilot L. Ins. Co. v. Owen, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1929) 31
F. (2d) 862 (forfeiture for non-payment of premiums-treated as matter
of general law) ; Fountain & Herrirgton v. Mutual L. Ins. Co.. (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 120 (misrepresentations): Mutual Trust 1.. Ils.
Co. v. Ossen, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 317 (misrepresentations) :
Palmquist v. Standard Accid. Ins. Co., (S.D. Cal. 1933) 3 F. Supp.
356 (accident policy-warranty) ; Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v.
Nikolopulos, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 12 (disability benefits);
Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Aaron, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1940) 108 F.
(2d) 777 (reformation for mistake); Ruhlin v. New York L. Ins. Co..
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 921. cert. denied (1940) 309 U. S.
655, 60 Sup. Ct. 469, 84 L. Ed. 1005. rehearing denied (1940) 309 U. S.
695, 60 Sup. St. 588, 84 L. Ed. 1035 (incontestability regarding disability
dictum) ; Flittner v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S., (1916) 30 Cal.
App. 209. 157 Pac. 630 (disaffirmance by infant) Pomeroy v. Manhattan
L. Ins. Co., (1866) 40 Ill. 398 (assignment) ; Millard v. Brayton. (1901)
177 Mass. 533, 59 N. W. 436, 52 L. R. A. 117, 83 Am. St. Rep. 294
(designation of beneficiary) Expressman's Mut. Ben. Assoc. v. Hurlock,
(1900) 91 Md. 585, 46 Atl. 957, 80 Am. St. Rep. 470 (change of beneficiary)
Lukens v. International L. Ins. Co., (1917) 269 Mo. 574, 191
S. W. 418, writ of error dismissed (1919) 248 U. S. 596, 39 Sup. Ct. 182,
63 L. Ed. 438 (suicide) ; Saunders v. Union Central L. Ins. Co., (1923)
212 Mo. App. 186, 253 S. W. 177 (forfeiture for non-payment of premiums) ; McElroy v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., (1909) 84 Neb. 866. 122
N. W. 27, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 968, 19 Ann. Cas. 28 (premium notices):
Stephan v. Prairie L. Ins. Co., (1925) 113 Neb. 469, 203 N. W. 626
(death in "military service") ; Pool v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
(1908) 123 App. Div. 885, 108 N. Y. S. 431 (designation of beneficiary).
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been noticed, payment of the premium in advance generally does
not protect the applicant from the latter types of contingencies.
Nor have courts considered unimportant the fact that the policy is
dated back to the application, and so deprives the applicant of a
few days or weeks of insurance.
Because an applicant otherwise has little incentive for making
premium payments in advance, a number of companies have
authorized the soliciting agent to use a special type of receipt
when payment occurred in advance and have indicated this
authority in the application.2 This paper is variously known as a
conditional receipt, binder, or binding receipt. In some instances
no special receipt is used but the application embodies special provisions applicable -when payment is made in advance. In these
circumstances the applicant has generally understood that he was
temporarily insured from date of the medical examination until
notice of rejection of the application by the home-office. The use
of the binder receipts has presented questions of their effect in
cases of interim changes in health; of the time within which the
company may set aside the policy for fraudulent procurement;
and of the time within which subsequent premiums must be paid
to prevent forfeiture.28 Before considering conflict of laws cases
it is necessary to notice the provisions of these receipts and some
general problems raised by them.
These receipts are of several possible varieties, which may lead
to radically different results. One constitutes a contract of unconditional temporary insurance; if it is used an applicant is
9
2
protected during the period thefeof.

-Of the policy forms of one hundred thirteen companies examined, application forms were available for one hundred ten of these companies;
of these either the policy or application or both of sixty companies provided substantially "that except under conditions stated in the binding receipt there shall be no contract of insurance until the policy shall be issued by the company," implying a possibly different rule if a binder
receipt
2 were issued.
' For discussion and cases on these points see Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, (1938) 33 Ill.
L. Rev. 180; Note, Operation
of Binding Receipts in Life Insurance, (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 1223; 1
Couch. Cyc. of Ins. Law (1929) sec. 91; 1 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance (2d
ed. 1927) 809-820; Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930) 195-198; Richards, Law
of Insurance (4th ed. 1932) 103.
290ne company, but to only a very limited extent, uses this form of
receipt: "That the insurance granted hereunder is only for the period of
thirty consecutivd days immediately following the delivery of this receipt,
and shall automatically terminate, without notice or any action on the part
of the company, at the end of that period, and shall automatically terminate
before the end of that period if a policy shall be issued by the company
and delivered to the applicant while in good health and the balance of
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The others are for conditional temporary insurance and are
of two types. The first conditional type is substantially as follows :80
"If the first premium is paid at the time of making this application and the receipt therefor is delivered by the agent and if
after investigation and medical examination the company approves
this application, such insurance shall be effective from the date
of the medical examination." 31
the full annual premium is paid."
Another company uses this form: "...
If the first premium has
been paid or settled for, the policy shall be in force from its date. If tho
first premium has not been paid or settled for, there shall be no contract
of insurance until and unless the policy is delivered to the applicant and
the first premium paid or settled for while the person insured is living
and in good health."
Goble, Cases on Insurance (1931) 42, gives the following form of
receipt: ". . . In consideration of the representations and agreements contained in the said application, and of the payment of the above sum, the
above-mentioned life is asured, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the policy which may be granted in this particular case, for
thirty days from the present date. Should the company decline to issue
the policy, the assurance hereby granted thereupon ceases, and in such
case the amount herein acknowledged shall be returned to the applicant. ..."
See also Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, (1938) 33 II.
L. Rev. 180, 181.
3OThese forms are discussed in Note, 44 Yale L. J. 1223, 1224-1225.
31
LFrom an examination of binder receipts available from forty-one
companies, this and the following note show the variances in forms,
and in comparison only with the number examined give some indicia
of the relative frequency of the clauses. It is possible, of course, that this
ratio would not obtain upon comparison of forms of all companies.
"If the first premium is paid . . . and receipt . . . is delivered
• . . the insurance shall be effective, subject to the provisions of the
policy applied for, from the date of the medical examination therefor as
shown . . . upon approval by an executive officer of the company .
etc. (used by three companies).
"If the first premium is paid . . . and this application is thereafter
approved by the company for the amount . . . the insurance will be enforced
from the date of such approval . . . and the policy year begins with such
approval" (used by four companies). "Provided that on said date I was
insurable in accordance with theh plan" etc. (added by one company).
"And shall not have consulted a physician between the date of the application and approval" (added by one company).
"If the first premium is paid . . . and receipt . . . and if after
medical examination and full investigation the company . . . unconditionally approves this application for tileamount and plan . . . such
insurance, subject to the provisions of the policy applied for, shall be
effective as from the date of the medical examination" (used by one
company). "Whether the policy be delivered to or received by me or not"
(added by one company).
"... And if said company at its home-office shall after investigation unconditionally approve and accept this application . . . then and
not otherwise it shall be in force from the date of the medical examination" (used by three companies).
"... The insurance applied for shall take effect from the date
of this application in accordance. . . . Provided this application is accepted and approved . . ." (used by four companies).
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This may be contrasted with the second conditional t3pe:
"If the first premium is paid at the time of making this application and the xeceipt therefor is delivered by the agent, then if the
company, after investigation and medical examination, shall be
satisfied that at the time of said medical examination I was insurable and entitled under the company's rules "tothe insurance on the
plan and for the amount applied for, the insurance
shall take effect
3 2as of the date of said medical examination. "
It will be noticed that the first of the conditional receipts quoted
above is dependent upon approval and acceptance at the homeoffice of the insurer. It follows that a contract will not occur until
the-time of that approval and acceptance. The general result, of
course, is that the applicant is not protected against the con33
tingency of interim changes in health or of death.
Under the second type of conditional receipt quoted above, it
has been pointed ou 4 that the company must accept the application and issue a policy if the risk was satisfactory at the time
of the medical examination, regardless of subsequent changes;
here the term "satisfactory" should be limited to meaning "honestly satisfied."
2
3 The variances in this clause can be indicated by the use of symbols
for additions or omissions to be indicated below:
"If the first premium is paid (a) and the company (b) (after investigation and medical examination) shall be satisfied that at the time
of said medical examination the applicant wras insurable and entitled
under the company's rule and standards to the insurance on the plan
and for the amount applied for, the insurance shall take effect as of the
dat6 of said medical examination: (c)(d) (e)but if another policy is
issued, then . . .":
In substance .the foregoing provision is used by fourteen companies,
of which four omit the clause in parentheses following the symbol (b).
(a) At this point may be inserted: "the company shall consider
and act upon said application in accordance with its rules .. .and if
it shall be satisfied . . ." (one company). This does not change the tenor
of the receipt. Or there may be inserted at that point this clause: "and
if the application is approved and a policy issued as applied for . . . it

shall be in force from the date of the application (or from the date of
the medical examination). . . !' (three companies); classification under
type I or II is doubtful.
(c)At this point there may be inserted the following clause: "But the
company may at any time before delivery of said policy, upon receipt
of additional information, reconsider any approvral hereof and decline the
insurance if it is not then satisfied that I wmas insurable on the date of
said medical examination" (one company). This clause throws the whole
provision into conditional type I.
(d) Inserted; "whether the policy is delivered to and received by
the applicant or not" (two companies).
(e) Inserted: "the company having until its approval of such application to consider the question of such insurability" (one company). Classification under conditional type I or II then becomes doubtful.
33See,
44 Yale L. J.1223, 1226.
34
See, 44 Yale L. J.1223, 1227.
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The cases dealing with these problems-in both internal and
conflict of laws situations-have occasioned a great deal of confusion. Courts have frequently failed to distinguish between
binder receipts providing for unconditional temporary insurance
of the two types indicated above.35 The majority of courts have
construed these receipts as embodying only an offer which must
first be accepted by the company and have ruled that the insurance
came into effect at the time of approval of the application at the
home-office of the insurer. It has been suggested " that clarification can come most quickly by the insurance companies adopting
the unconditional temporary insurance plan. In conflict of laws
cases the confusion indicated has resulted in a strong tendency
to apply the law of the state of the insurer's home-office; the available cases on both sides of the question are indicated in the notes.-35

Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, (1938) 33 Il. L. Rev.
180, 186.
On the other hand, MacLean, Life Insurance (5th ed. 1939) 514-515,
takes the view that the function of the binding receipt is not to insure in
the interim, but it is not made clear which type of receipt is there considered or whether a distinction is to be made.
36
Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev.
180, 186.
3
7Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Nixon, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1897)
81 Fed. 796 (binder apparently of first conditional type; law of insurer's
home-office applied regarding obligation to pay premium); Equitable L.
Assur. Soc. v. Trimble, (C.C.C. 9th Cir. 1897) 83 Fed. 85 (same judge as in
Nixon Case, on same facts, gave same decision) ; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v.
Cohen, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 66 (binder of first conditional
type and law of insurer's home-state applied regarding question of misrepresentations) ; Ruhlin v. New York L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939)
106 F. (2d) 921, cert. denied (1940) 309 U. S. 655, 60 Sup. Ct. 169,
84 L. Ed. 1005, rehearing denied (1940) 309 U. S. 695, 60 Sup. Ct. 588, 84
L. Ed. 1035 (court did not make clear which type of receipt was used and
applied law of insurer's home-state on issue of incontestability) ; Harrington v. Home L. Ins. Co., (1899) 128 Cal. 531, 58 Pac. 180 (receipt of first
conditional type and law of insurer's home-state applied regarding premium
notices) ; Fried v. Royal Ins. Co. of Liverpool, (1866) 47 Barb. (N.Y.)
127, affirmed (1872) 50 N. Y. 243 (apparently unconditional type of
binder receipt and court applied law of place of making on effectiveness of
tender of premium to agent) ; Fields v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S..
(Mo. App. 1938) 118 S. W. (2d) 521 (apparently treated as conditional
receipt of first type and law of insurer's home-state applied regarding
suicide); Kempf v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S., (Mo. App. 1916)
184 S. W. 133 (same type of binder as in Fields case but court treated
it as of the second conditional type and applied law of state of making
when applicant died before receiving a "rated" policy) ; Weed v. Bank
Say. L. Ins., (Mo. Ap. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 653 (conditional receipt
of second type and court applied law of place of making in regard to duty
to mail premium notices) ; Pickett v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S..
(Mo. App. 1930) 27 S. W. (2d) 452 (type of binder not indicated and
court applied law of place of making in regard to suicide) ; Keenan v.
John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass., (1929) 50 R. I. 158,
146 At. 401 (type of binder not indicated and court applied law of place
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In both the internal law and conflict of laws situations this
result is unfortunate. For both types of cases the function of
the binder receipt, which can be of benefit to both the applicant
and the insurer, is to get the insurance into force at the earliest
possible time, namely, at the time of payment of the first premium
in advance. 3s For conflict of laws purposes there are frequently
strongest reasons against reference by a forum court to rules of the
state of the insurer's home-office.
It should not be overlooked that in earlier days insurance companies provided in applications and policies that the contract
should be taken as entered into at the insurer's home-office and
subject to construction by the law of that place; except in unusual
circumstances, these provisions were consistently struck down by
the courts.39 If the binder receipts are so treated by the courts
that they defeat the expectation of the applicant that he is
protected from the time of the medical examination, and are further
accepted as selecting choice-of-laws rules favorable to insurers
by reference to their home-states, then the use of this device may
well be increased. The history of insurance law indicates that if
serious mistakes recur one or both of two steps are taken, that
is, either the courts must change their approach to troublesome
problems, which for a"time will increase the confusion already
surrounding that part of the field, or legislation will be enacted.
The current general use by the companies of clauses calling
for delivery, delivery in good health, and payment of the first
premium point to a desire to postpone the risk until a time when
the policy is finally connected with the applicant. The binder
receipts represent an important trend in the opposite direction.
of making regarding misrepresentations); International L. & Accid. Ins.
Co. v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 20 S. V. (2d) 142 (the binder

apparently covered interim death and court applied law of place of making
on issue of refund of premiums paid).
3
SThis is not true, as to the insurer only, in respect to conditional

binding receipts of the first type. They are at least misleading to the
applicant. But for conflict of laws purposes this type of receipt presents no
reason for shifting choice-of-laws rules from the usual connection with
manual receipt of the policy. Conditional receipts of the first type are
now 39dropped out of further discussion of these problems.
0nly one of the one hundred thirteen American policy forms ex-

amined provided for construction by the law of the home-office as the
place of making; a provision of this type would be valid where the insurer was not engaged in interstate activity. On the other hand, one policy

expressly provides that if any portion is inconsistent with laws of any
state where the insurance is written, it shall be held to be modified to
the extent necessary to conform thereto, inconsistent policy provisions be

considered stricken out, ind there be read into the policy any further
provisions necessary to conform to such state laws.
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Although courts may continue to effectuate the manual conception
of delivery connected with those clauses first mentioned, the
binder receipts should not be permitted to become a device for
shifting governing rules of law to the home-office of the insurer,
or for postponing the time of inception of the relationship. Use
of the binder receipt in the internal law of insurance can result
in the applicant becoming insured at the earliest possible time; for
purposes of conflict of laws the contract can be considered made
in the state where the application was made and the binder receipt
was given. Here delivery need not be an important problem; if
delivery connotes payment of the premium, that has occurred.
If delivery connotes manual transfer of the document, it may be
related to the binder receipt, instead of to the insurance policy, or
it may -be said that manual delivery is not required since the circumstance of the binder receipt is sufficient to point to the time
and place where the risk had its inception. If the use of binder
receipts increases, with possible benefits to both the future applicant and the insurer, each will need certainty in both internal and
conflict of laws rules to be applied.
4.

MAILING OF THE POLICY

An important question is whether an insurance policy may
be taken as delivered at the time the document is mailed from the
home-office of the company. In a leading article dealing with the
problems of delivery in the general field of insurance law it has
been said :40
"In only two states, it seems, is the formation of the contract
postponed until the delivery of the policy by the local agent to
the applicant, and in those states the conclusion is supported upon
the theory that the insurer's acceptance of the applicant's offer
must be actually communicated to the latter; not until then is a
contract formed. On the other hand, the decided weight of
authority is that the contract comes into existence before this
final step takes place. .. ."
In the past twenty years there has been a decided increase in
the number of companies using forms which contain a clause
requiring delivery while the applicant is in good health; at the
present time ninety-one companies employ it.4" It is possible
that examination of the more recent cases would indicate that
increased use of this clause may have changed the pattern of
4
Patterson. The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919)
L. Rev. 198, 203.

41This provision is considered in subdivision 6, infra.

33 Harv.
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decisions on this point. This possibility was foreseen, for that
article states :42
"The stipulations requiring a delivery of the policy to the
applicant have been literally construed in most instances and it
has accordingly been held by most of the courts which have
passed on the question that if the applicant dies before the delivery
of the policy to him, no recovery can be had."
Whatever may be the present rule in internal law situations,
in the conflict of laws decisions, on the other hand, there have
been relatively few cases holding that delivery occurred at the time
the policy was mailed from the home-office to the insured"5 or to
the solicitinj agent of the company. 4" In the former instance, a
life insurance policy would very probably not be mailed to the
insured unless he had complied with all conditions including that
of payment of the premium.
In internal law cases where payment was made at the time
of application there is no reason for delaying inception of the
contract until its actual receipt; the necessity for holding that an
applicant is protected by insurance at the earliest possible time has
been liersuasive with the great majority of courts which have
held that mailing of the policy constitutes delivery. But several
important considerations bear upon unlikelihood of this rule being
extended in conflict of laws cases.
-There is now an almost universal practice by insurers to mail
the policy to the soliciting agent for transfer to the applicant;
modern advertising shows the effort of the companies to build
up personal insurance contacts between the solicitor and those
42
Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198, 221.
43
Jackson v. New York L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d)
31 (death before actual delivery-dictum only and point treated as matter
of general insurance law); Jones v. "Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., (1936) 158
Misc. Rep. 466, 286 N. Y. S. 4 (waiver of "good health!' clause; dictum) ;
Tuttle v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assoc., (1905) 132 Iowa 652, 104
N. W. 1131, 7 L. R. A. (N.S.) *23 (accident policy--suicide). See 2
Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) sec. 317.1.
44
Desmazes v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., (D. fass. 1878) 7 Ins. Law I.
926, Fed. Cas. No. 3,821 (forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums):
Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc. v. Harris, (1900) 94 Tex. 25, 57 S. W. 635, 86
Am. St. Rep. 813 (misrepresentations); Jefferson v. New York L. Ins.
Co., (1913) 151 Ky. 609, 152 S. W. 780 (good health clause; but note
that the premium had not been paid) ; Spencer v. Myers, (1896) 150 N. Y.
269, 44 N. E. 942, 55 Am. St. Rep. 675, 34 L. R. A. 175 (capacity to
assign-dictum); Milhous v. Johnson, (1889) 51 Hun. (N.Y.) 639, 4
N. Y. S. 199 (assignability); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Babcock, (1898)
104 Ga. 67, 30 S. E. 273 (interim death) ; Coci v. New York L. Ins. Co.,
(1924) 155 La. 1060, 99 So. 871 (interim death). See 2 Beale, Treatise
on the Law of Conflict of Laws (1935) sec. 319.1.
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with continuing needs. A general practice of mailing policies
direct to the applicant would destroy valuable contacts useful to
the continued flow of premium payments and the possibility of
new business. Further, no insurer is likely to mail the policy
direct to the applicant in circumstances where a collector is needed
for the unpaid first premium.
If premiums are paid in advance and the insurer mails the
policy directly to the applicant, courts may deal with insurance
prob'ems in several different ways. When a binding receipt has
been issued at the time of payment, it was suggested in the preceding subdivision that courts may well hold that the insurance
became effective at the time and place where the application was
signed and the premium was paid; the law of that state may be
used for conflict of laws purposes. In this situation it is unnecessary for a court to consider either the mailing of the policy or
its physical receipt by the applicant to determine the date of the
inception of the insurance relationship or to localize the law governing the contract.
If, in another situation, the first premium is paid in advance but
no binder receipt is issued and the insurer mails the policy directly
to the applicant, courts may determine the time and place of
delivery according to other legal problems presented in the cases.
If the question of the time when the insurance becomes effective
is raised by death of the applicant after the policy was approved
and mailed but before it was received, or if the question is raised
by an adverse change in health conditions of the applicant during
this interim, a court may hold that delivery occurred at the time
of mailing of the policy; in these circumstances it is seldom important to determine which law governs this question and the
case will accordingly be treated as one of general insurance law.
But if the applicant receives the policy in his life-time and goodhealth, then the legal questions presented by warranties, suicide,
assignment. etc.. may turn upon the choice-of-laws rules selected;
here it is necessary for a court to define the place of delivery.
"Delivery" may be defined as "mailing of the policy," relating
the conflict of laws rule to the state of the insurer's home-office;
or "delivery" may be defined as "physical receipt of the document,"
relating the conflict of laws rule to the applicant's home-state. In
varying situations different connotations of delivery may be used.
The same considerations noticed above in connection with
policies mailed directly to the applicant apply also in circumstances
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where the policy is transmitted to the soliciting agent of the
insurer. As a practical matter most policies are mailed to the
agent and insurers generally make no distinction between policies
for which there has or has not been payment of premiums. This
is true even though'there may not be included a provision for
delivery only while the applicant is in good health. Probably
because of this common practice and because of a desire to connect the contract with local law, the courts in conflict of laws decisions generally have attached no importance to the act of transmitting the policy through the mail, whether addressed to the
insured or to the soliciting agent, and although these facts were
shownmhave not treated them as constituting delivery. "Mailing
of the policy" has not become an important connotation of "delivery" in conflict of laws cases.
5.

MAN UAL RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENT

Before indicating the conflict of laws cases defining "delivery"
as equivalent to manual receipt of the document, it is useful for
purposes of comparison to notice some principles of contract law
which may be operative in insurance cases not presenting conflict
of laws problems. Consideration was made at an earlier point
of the proposition that, even when the policy was issued subject
to payment of the first premium, *the contract might be taken as
formed by acts of acceptance at the place of the insurer's homeoffice, subject to avoidance by the insurer for non-performance
of a condition precedent-to-performance--that of payment of the
premium. A difficulty with this proposition lies in the word "acceptance" as applied to the act of the insurer, and interpretation
of this term depends upon the theory of contract which courts
may adopt. In the general field of insurance law the contractual
theories of meeting of the minds, communication, and significant
act bearing upon acceptance will all tend to determine the inception of the contract antecedent to the time at which the applicant
receives the printed policy.45 The act of mailing from the insurer's
home-office would constitute not only a significant act indicating
that a contract had been formed but would also furnish the probability-of-notice factor which is the basis of the communication
theory of contracts and would represent the meeting of the minds
of the parties in all but a minute fraction of the cases. That this
45An

excellent short discussion of these views is found in Patterson,

The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919)

202-218.

33 Harv. L. Rev. 198,
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approach constitutes a departure from orthodox contracts prin4
ciples is recognized. ,
In the general law of insurance the trend of decisions holding
that for some purposes the legally significant act of acceptance
may occur before manual delivery of the policy to the insured
operated to remove defenses based upon interim changes in health
and, in some jurisdictions, death of the insured before the policy
came into his physical possession. To meet the challenge insurers
inserted clauses in the application, policy or receipt stating that
the insurance should not be effective until the policy was delivered. 47 The internal law cases adopted a traditional attitude
toward freedom of contract and generally enforced these pro41
visions.
This tendency is also marked in the conflict of laws cases.
The terms "significant act" or "last necessary act" are not there
employed in the sense of theoretical acceptance of the offer by the
insurance company but are used in the sense of an act definitely
linking the contract to the place of application as the locus contractus. The formalistic conception of delivery associated with
deeds and negotiable instruments is the one commonly employed
in connection with insurance policies in conflict of laws decisions.
The indefinite phrase "delivery to the insured" is frequently all
that is thought necessary to relate the contract to the place where
application was made and the courts have employed the term in
the sense of physical receipt of the document.' 9 Many courts are
46"It is important to note, however, that the foregoing decisions in
which the contract was held to have been completed when the policy reached
the local agent, or at some earlier stage in the process, represent a distinct advance in legal doctrine beyond the ordinary contract-by-correspondence cases." Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919)
33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 207.
47Of the one hundred thirteen forms examined, ninety-six provide in
the application or policy or both that the policy must be delivered; there is
variance in the form of this provision, including the following clauses:
"delivered by a duly authorized agent of the company"; "manually (or
actually) delivered to the applicant" (only nine carry this clause) ; and
delivered "during applicant's life and continuance in good health." The
last of these provisions is considered in the following subdivision.
48See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919)
33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 221.
49Knights Templars' & Masons' L. Indem. Co. v. Berry, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1892) 50 Fed. 511 (suicide) ; Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v.
Winning, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 58 Fed. 541, 19 U. S. App. 173 (forfeiture for non-payment of premiums) ; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Webber,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 22, cert. denied (1932) 287 U. S. 662,
53 Sup. Ct. 221, 77 L. Ed. 572 (misrepresentations) ; Fountain & Herrington v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., (C.CA. 4th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 120 (misrepresentations) ; Palmquist v. Standard Accid. Ins. Co., (S. D. Cal.
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only a trifle more explicit in saying that the policy "was mailed
to the agent for delivery to the insured,"
again implying that
manual transfer is the significant act ° As pointed out, this is
1933) 3 F. Supp. 356 (accident policy-wvarranty) ; Lando v. Equitable L.
Assur. Soc. of U. S., (N.D. Cal. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 729 (disability benefits) ;
Denton v. Travelers' Ins. Co, (D.C. Md. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 556 (accident
insurance); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Levin, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1939) 102
F. (2d) 403 (cancellation); Ruhlin v. New York L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A.
3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 921, cert. denied (1940) 309 U. S. 655, 60
Sup. Ct. 469, 84 L. Ed. 1005, rehearing denied (1940) 309 U. S. 695, 60
Sup. Ct. 588, 84 L. Ed. 1035 (incontestability regarding disability-dietum) ; Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Aaron, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1940)
108 F. (2d) 777 (reformation for mistake) ; Mutual Res. Fund L. Assoc. v.
Minehart, (1904) 72 Ark. 630, 83 S. W. 323 (premium notices) ; Springfield Mut. Assoc. v. Atnip, (1925) 169 Ark. 968, 279 S.W. 15 (misrepresentation) ; Flittner v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S, (1916) 30 Cal.
App. 209, 157 Pac. 630 (disaffirmance by infant) ; Prudential L. Ins. Co.
of Amer. v. Fusco's Adm'r, (1911) 145 Ky. 378, 140 S. IV. 566 (excessive insurance); Chamberlain v. National L. & Accid. Ins. Co., (1934)
256 Ky. 548, 76 S.W. (2d) .628 (misrepresentations) ; Millard v.Brayton,
(1901) 177 Mass. 533, 59 N. E. 436, 83 Am. St. Rep. 294, 52 L. R. A.
117 (designation of beneficiary); Mfodem Brotherhood of America v.
Quady, (1928) 175 Minn. 462, 221 N. IV. 721, 59 A. L. IL 162 (designation of beneficiary); Smith v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., (1903) 173 Mo.
329, 72 S. W. 935 (forfeiture); Grant v. North America Ben. Corp.,
(1928) 223 Mo. App. 104, 8 S.IV. (2d) 1043 (consequence of contract by
unlicensed corporation); Saunders v. Union Central L. Ins. Co., (1923)
212 Mo. App. 186, 9-53 S. W. 177 (forfeiture for non-payment of premiums); Limbaugh v. Monarch L. Ins. Co., (Mo. App. 1935) 84 S. W.
(2d) 208 (misrepresentations); O'Maley v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins.
Co., (Mo. App. 1936) 95 S. IV. (2d) 852, cert. denied (1936) 299 U. S.
585, 57 Sup. Ct. 110, 81 L. Ed. 431 (misrepresentations); Stephan v.
Prairie L. Ins. Co., (1925) 113 Neb. 469, 203 N. W. 626 (death in
"military service"); Mfees v. Pittsburgh L. & T. Co., (1915) 169 App.
Div. 86, 154 N. "Y.S. 660 (misrepresentations); United States Mtg. &
T. Co. v. Ruggles, (1932) 258 N. Y. 32, 179 N. E. 250 (policies were
"obtained;" rights of creditors); Cantey v. Philadelphia L. Ins. Co.,
(1932) 166 S. C. 181, 164 S. E. 609 (forfeiture); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Greene, (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 122

S. W. (2d) 656 (mode of enforcement of disability claim-polices were
"delivered to and accepted" in forum).

5
oSupreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, (1905) 198 U. S.
508, 25 Sup. Ct. 754, 49 L. Ed. 1146 .(suicide); Whitcomb v. Phoenix
Mut. L. Ins. Co., (D. Mass. 1879) 11 Chi. Leg. News 408, 8 Ins. Law

J. 624, Fed Cas. No. 17,530 (forfeiture, but quaere the decision); North-

western Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Elliott (D. Or. 1880) 7 Sawy. 17, 5 Fed.

225 (validity of contract of unlicensed corporation) ; Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co.
v. Robison, (N.D. Iowa 1893) 54 Fed. 580, affirmed (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1893) 58 Fed. 723, 19 U. S. App. 266, 22 L. R. A. 375 (misrepresentations); Hicks v. National L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1894) 60 Fed. 690,
20 U_ S. App. 410 (forfeiture for non-payment of premiums) ; Miller v.
.Maryland Cas. Co., (CC.A. 3d Cir.- 1912) 193 Fed. 343 (health and acci-

dent policy-misrepresentations); Pilot L. Ins. Co. v. Owen, (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1929) 31 -F,(2d) 862 (forfeiture for non-payment of premiums) ;
Mutual Trust L. Ins. Co. v. Ossen, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d)
317 (misrepi'sentations); Coci v. New York L. Ins. Co., (1924) 155 La.
1060, 99 So. 871 (interim death); Expressman's Mfut. Ben. Assoc. v.
Hurlock, (1900) 91 Md. 585, 46 At. 957, 80 Am. St. Rep. 470 (designation of beneficiary); Horton v. New York L. Ins. Co., (1899) 151 Mo.
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frequently connected with "payment of the first premium" to
the agent. Either factor,,alone has been sufficient to draw control
of the law governing the contract away from the state of the
home-office of the company. When conjoined the effect of the
two clauses has been almost irresistible.

6.

DELIVERY

IN

GOOD HEALTH

The "delivery-in-good-health" clause plays an important part
in defining the term "delivery" in conflict of laws cases. In the
absence of statutes insurance companies formerly had the benefit
of warranties in the application and also of the common law rule

imposing a duty upon an applicant to disclose interim changes
in health. But with the development of statutes converting most
statements of health from warranties into representations, the
insurers sought to regain a measure of protection by insertion of
clauses requiring delivery of the policy while the applicant was
in good health. 51 This clause is usually worded as a condition precedent. In internal law cases the effect of the decisions has been
to treat the clause as if it were a condition precedent-to-performance, rather than precedent-to-formation as was the apparent
intention of the insurers, 52 and the burden of proof of non-per604, 52 S. W. 356 (forfeiture) ; Lukens v. International L. Ins. Co.,
(1917) 269 Mo. 574, 191 S. W. 418, writ of error dismissed (1919)
248 U. S. 596, 39 Sup. Ct. 182, 63 L. Ed. 438 (suicide); Weed v. Bank
Say. L. Ins. Co., (Mo. App. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 653 (premium notices);
Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hale, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 267 S. W. 282
(misrepresentations); Ofield v. National Ben. L. Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927) 293 S. W. 271 (health change); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 13 S. W. (2d) 720 (refund of premiums
from unlicensed corporation) ; Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Warwick, (1871)
20 Gratt. (Va.) 614, 3 Am. Rep. 218 (forfeiture for non-payment of
premiums).
51
In comparison, a study by Fouse, Policy Contracts in Life Insurance, appearing in September, 1905, 26 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc.
Science 209, 220, reported that of fifty-one companies whose forms were
examined all had a provision in the policy that it shall not become effective and binding until delivered during the lifetime and good health of
the insured and after the required premium is actually paid.
A later study by Coke, The Commencement of the Risk in the Case
of a Life Insurance Policy (1921) Paper 51, Assoc. of Life Ins. Counsel
2, 3, reported that the clause appeared in one hundred twelve out of one
hundred twenty-five policies examined. See Note, Delivery in Good Health
Clause in Life Insurance Policies (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1508,
The present writer has found that in forms examined of one hundred
thirteen companies writing in 1938, ninety-one carried the delivery-ingood-health clause; in these further provision was found that that policy
must also be delivered within a limited time or the application be considered rejected; within sixty days (thirteen companies) ; within forty(one company); within thirty days (three companies).
five 5days
2
Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 198, 220.
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formance has been allocated to the company.53 In these circumstances it is only a short step to hold that the duty to perform
may arise before manual transfer to the applicant, and hence the
cases holding that constructive delivery is sufficient are controlling
even in the face of the delivery-in-good-health clause."
In the conflict of lavs cases, on the other hand, where the
problem is not primarily as to the time of inception of the risk
but as to the choice-of-laws rules to govern various problems,
there are a number of cases emphasizing the presence of the
clause and regarding the policy as requiring manual transfer of
the document." But it has been held that a somewhat similar
phrase, "delivered in my lifetime," added nothing to the phrase
"delivered to" and recovery was allowed without manual transfer.5 6
7. ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLICY

A factor bearing upon the content of the delivery conception
which has received unnecessary, and frequently erroneous, emphasis is acceptance of the policy or acceptance of the conditions
by the insured. Several distinct situations may be noticed.
In cases where the terms of the policy forwarded by the company-are materially different than those called for by the appli53

Note, The Delivery in Good Health Clause in Life Insurance Policies (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1508, 1515.
54
Note, The Delivery in Good Health Clause in Life Insurance Policies, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1508, 1510.
55Mutual Trust L. Ins. Co. v. Ossen, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 77 F.
(2d) 317 (misrepresentations); Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S. v.
Nikolopulos, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 12 (disability benefits);
Mowery v. Washington Nat. L. Ins. Co., (1937) 289 Ill. App. 443, 7
N. E. (2d) 334 ("plain meaning" statute requiring exceptions to be
printed in the same size of type) ; Waddell v. New England Mut. L. Ins.
Co., (1924) 83 Ind. App. 209, 147 N. E. 816 (forfeiture); Jefferson v.
New York L. Ins. Co., (1913) 151 Ky. 609, 152 S. AV. 780 (extended
insurance); Hardie v. St. Louis Mut. L. Ins. Co., (1874) 26 La. Ann.
242 (coupled with requirement of payment of premium-interim death);
Coci v. New York L. Ins. Co., (1924) 155 La. 1060, 99 So. 871 (interim
death-dictum since binder case); McElroy v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co.,
(1909) 84 Neb. 866, 122 N. W. 27, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 968, 19 Ann.
Cas. 28 (premium notice); Jones v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., (1936) 158
Misc. Rep. 466, 286 N. Y. S. 4 (held waiver of clause); Keasler v.
Mutual L. Ins. Co. of N. Y., (1919) 177 N. C. 394, 99 S. E. 97 (question
of waiver of clause); Ofield v. National Ben. L. Ins. Co., (Trc~. Civ. App.
1927) 293 S.W. 271 (health- change); National L. & Accid. Ins. Co. v.
Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 20 S. W. (2d) 142- (although a binder
case; suit for refund of premiums from unlicensed company).
Contra, Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc. v. Harris, (1900) 94 Tex. 25, 57
S. W. 635, 86 Am. St. Rep. 813 (misrepresentations held material).
56Jackson v. New York L. Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1925) 7 F.
(2d) 31.
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cation, the policy submitted amounts to a counter-offer.57 If the
application was contingent upon the applicant's approval of the
policy, the latter represents an offer. In either case some act of
the applicant is necessary to constitute an acceptance and the
insurance is in effect only from the time of his approval. 8 There
is no question regarding the correctness of the principle in cases
of this type. Nor is there difficulty with instances in which the
insurer calls for a final act of written acceptance of the contract
by the insured; this most frequently occurs in the case of membership in fraternal benefit associations. 9
But objection lies to the inclusion in opinions of general statements implying that acceptance by the insured is necessary in all
cases. Statements such as those following, unless coupled with
factors mentioned above, are at variance not only with the general
rules of contracts but also with sound principles of insurance law.
Thus courts have used this language in conflict of laws cases:
"On the contrary, we see no reason why the general rule
applicable to contracts of this character should not apply, namely,
that the contract is not a completed contract until it is tendered
by one party and accepted by the other. '" "The delivery of the
policy was essential to the completion of the contract, and was
5

7That this is not an uncommon situation is indicated by the following clause, the substance of which appears in the applications of sixty-six
out of a total of one hundred ten examined: "and if the company shall
issue a policy on the applicant's life other than as herein applied for
and the same shall be accepted, this application shall constitute the applicant's application for the policy, but no change shall be made in the
amount of insurance, classification, plan or benefit unless agreed to in
writing."
58
Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co. of
N. Y., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1902) 115 Fed. 77, affirmed on rehearing (1903)
124 Fed. 25 (credit insurance; court applied a general insurance statute
on misrepresentations) ; Provident Say. L. Assur. Soc. of N. Y. v. Hadley,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1900) 102 Fed. 856 (misrepresentations) ; White v. Empire
State Degree of Honor, (1911) 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 52 (suicide). And see
Ulman v. Supreme Conmmandery of United Order of Golden Cross of the
World, (1915) 220 Mass. 422, 107 N. E. 960 (lack of medical examination required under by-laws).
Contra, Kempf v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. of U. S., (Mo. App. 1916)
184 S.
59 W. 133 (interim death).
Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, (1905) 198 U. S.
508, 25 Sup. Ct. 754, 49 L. Ed. 1146, affirming (1904) 178 N. Y. 63; 70
N. E. 111, 64 L. R. A. 839 (suicide) ; Supreme Colony United Order
of Pilgrim Fathers v. Towne, (1914) 87 Conn. 644, 89 Atl. 264, Ann. Cas.
1916B 181 (designation of beneficiary); Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of
World v. Havas, (1927) 217 Ky. 846, 290 S. W. 690 (insanity); Grant v.
North America Ben. Corp., (1928) 223 Mo. App. 104, 8 S. W. (2d) 1043
(contract of unlicensed corporation). And see the ratification clause, supra,
note 57.
6OExpressman's Mut. Ben. Assoc. v. Hurlock, (1900) 91 Md. 585,
46 AtI. 957, 959, 80 Am. St. Rep. 470 (designation of beneficiaries).
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- requisite to an action thereon. By this we mean there must have
been a final acceptance by both parties of the terms thereof, and
in this case such final acceptance did not take place until the
company presented the policy to the insured and he made payment and accepted it...
"
The idea of "acceptance of the policy" is not a normal and proper
connotation of delivery.
8.

OTHER CONNOTATIONS

oF

DELIVERY

It was formerly a common practice for life insurance companies to include a provision in their forms that the policy should
not be effective until countersigned by the soliciting agent; apparently this was designed to prevent inception of the contract
until payment of the premium and until a final opportunity to
ascertain that the applicant continued in good health. This provision is still common in fire and some other types of insurance
where the agent may have power to approve the risk, but is not
now used by life companies. In conflict of laws cases where this
clause was included in the policy courts have held that delivery
did not occur until the time when the policy was countersigned
and that the law of that place properly governed a variety of
problems presented. 62
Mutual benefit certificates or by-laws frequently provide that
insurance shall not be effective until the applicant has been initiat61
Lukens v. International L. Ins. Co., (1916) 269 Mo. 574, 191 S. W.
418, writ of error dismissed (1919) 248 U. S. 596, 39 Sup. Ct. 182, 63

L. Ed. 438 (suicide). Accord, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen v. Greene, (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 122 S. \V. (2d) 656 (mode
of enforcement of disability claim).
82
6 Whitcomb v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co., (D. M ass. 1879) 11 Chi.
Leg. News 408, 8 Ins. Law J 624, Fed. Cas. No. 17,530 (forfeiture-quaeie the decision); Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, (D. Or.
1880) 5 Fed. 225 (contract of unlicensed corporation) ; Miller v. Maryland
Cas. Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1912) 193 Fed. 343 (health and accident policy-

misrepresentations); Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Webb, (1875) 54 Ala.
688 (designation of beneficiary) ; Curtiss v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., (1891) 90
Cal. 245, 27 Pac. 211, 25 Am. St. Rep. 114 (insurable interest) ; Pomeroy

v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co., (1866) 40 Ill. 398 (capacity to assign); \Weiditschka v. Supreme Tent of Knights of 'faccabees, (1919) 188 Iowa 183,
170 N. WV. 300, rehearing denied (1920) 188 Iowa 183, 175 N. W. 835
(designation of beneficiary); Federal L. Ins. Co. v. Holmes' Committee,
(1930)

232 Ky. 834, 24 S. NV.

(2d) 906 (accident nolicy); Hardie v.

St. Louis Mut. L. Ins. Co., (1874) 26 La. Ann. 242 (interim death);
Badger v. American Popular L. Ins. Co., (1869) 103 Mass. 244, 4 Am.
Rep. 547; Dworak v. Supreme Lodge of Western Bohemian Fraternal

Assoc., (1917) 101 Neb. 297, 163 N. W. 471, Ann. Cas. 1918D 1153
(designation of beneficiary); Pacific fut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hale, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924) 267 S. W. 282 (health and accident policy-misrepresentations).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

ed into the local lodge; in these63 cases delivery is not effective
until induction into membership.

CONCLUSIONS

An examination of the delivery cases shows that the different
purposes for which definitional content may be made in internal
and conflict of laws rules are of primary importance. Employment of the delivery concept for choice-of-laws purposes may
lead to different connotations than in cases involving primarily
the question of the time at which the insurance was effective. In
respect to purely internal law situations, it has been suggested:
"At all events, indications are not wanting to show that the
contract-to-status transition may ere long attain conscious and
articulate recognition."'; But the same optimism can apply to
conflict of laws problems only by predicating the status as based
upon some significant factor closely connected with the state
wherein application was made to a foreign insurance company.
There is nothing inherently inconsistent with this position if it be
clearly borne in mind that the purposes of the two rules are distinct-one pertaining to time and the other to place-and that it
is only confusing to rely upon internal law cases to decide conflict of laws problems. Connotations of the delivery concept, even
in conflict of laws cases, also vary according to the type of sittation in which it is utilized. The foregoing pages have indicated
these connotations and have shown that in conflict of laws cases,
except in a few unusual situations, the courts adopt one or another connotation of delivery which will connect the policy with
the law of the state where the applicant resided and manually
received the policy. Thus the delivery concept is used as the
basis for selection of a governing rule of law to be applied to
various issues arising under policies of life insurance in conflict
of laws cases.
631Brooks v Travelers' Protective Assoc. of America. (E.D. N.Y.
1931) 47 F. (2d) 618 (period of limitations) ; Supreme Colony United
Order of Pilgrim Fathers v. Towne, (1914) 87 Conn. 644, 89 At. 264,
Ann. Cas. 1916B 181 (designation of beneficiary) ; Weiditschka v. Supreme
Tent of Knights of Maccabees, (1919) 188 Iowa 183, 170 N. W. 300, rehearing denied (1920) 188 Iowa 183, 175 N. W. 835 (designation of beneficiary); Dworak v. Supreme Lodge of Western Bohemian Fraternal
Assoc.. (1917) 101 Neb. 297, 163 N. W. 471, Ann. Cas. 1918D 1153
(designation of beneficiary).
64Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198, 218.

